Trust and wealth by Nebiler, Metin
TRUST AND WEALTH
by
METI˙N NEBI˙LER
Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Sabancı University August 2008
c©Metin Nebiler 2008
All Rights Reserved
ii
TRUST AND WEALTH
METI˙N NEBI˙LER
MA THESIS, 2008
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. MEHMET BAC.
Abstract
This thesis studies the relation between wealth and trust in a model where the abil-
ity to elicit trustworthiness from unrelated people depends on own wealth as well as
the wealth of other agents in the economy. Betray of trust leads to an enforcement stage.
In equilibrium, rich people trust and betray when matched with a relatively poor
agent, while the poor do not trust, and betray if matched with low wealth agents.
A constrained equilibrium is characterized in which agents devote all their wealth in
the enforcement stage, therefore, wealth changes directly influences the equilibrium re-
sources.
A betray region (combinations of wealth levels) in which all agents are untrustworthy
is identified and characterized. Redistribution of wealth concentrated on the betray
region is more likely to induce a zero trust equilibrium.
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O¨zet
Kis.isel servet ve dag˜ılımı ile tanımadıg˜ımız kis.ilere olan gu¨ven arasındaki ilis.ki kuramsal
ac.ıdan incelenmektedir. Ampirik bulgular bo¨yle bir ilis.kinin oldug˜una is.aret etmekte,
ancak iktisat literatu¨ru¨nde bu olguyu ac.ıklayacak teorik modeller henu¨z gelis.tirilmemis.tir.
Gu¨venin ko¨tu¨ye kullanıldıg˜ı durumlarda, verilen so¨zu¨n yerine getirilip getirilmeyeceg˜ini
taraflar arasında oynanan (yasal veya yasal olmayan) bir gu¨c. savas.ı belirlemektedir.
Oyunun dengesinde, zengin insanların gu¨venmeye daha yatkın oldug˜u, fakat kars.ılarındaki
insanların zenginlik seviyesi kendilerine oranla du¨s.u¨k ise, onların gu¨venini de ko¨tu¨ye kul-
lanmaya daha yatkın oldukları saptanmıs.tır. Aynı zamanda fakir insanların gu¨venmedikleri
ve eg˜er kars.ılarındaki insanlar daha fakir ise kendilerine olan gu¨veni de ko¨tu¨ye kul-
landıkları saptanmıs.tır. Kısıtlı diye tabir ettig˜imiz dengede insanlar sınırlı zenginlik
seviyelerine sahiplerdir ve gu¨c. savas.ı evresinde bu¨tu¨n zenginliklerini ayırmaktadırlar.
C. alıs.ma, gu¨venin ko¨tu¨ye kullanıldıg˜ı servet kombinasyonlarını belirlemektedir. Sonuc.
olarak bu tu¨r kombinasyonların yog˜un oldug˜u toplumlarda gu¨venin yog˜un olarak ko¨tu¨ye
kullanılacag˜ı, dolayısıyla gu¨ven duygusunun da sarsılacag˜ı, o¨ngo¨ru¨su¨ ortaya c.ıkmaktadır.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Trust is a very important part of people’s lives since many transactions among
people involve trust. Arrow (1973) states that ”there is an element of trust in ev-
ery transaction”. The nature of trust is strange: it bears some natural risks, which
is amplified when we trust individuals whom we don’t know. This “general” trust in
people draws attentions of many branches of social sciences including political science,
sociology, and economics. The definition of trust does not vary much among disci-
plines, however, the general definition can be summarized following Gambetta (1988),
as ”There is a degree of convergence in the definition of trust which can summarized as
follows: trust... is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action... When
we say we trust someone... , we implicitly mean that the probability that he will per-
form an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us
to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.” This definition may also
be called a “rational trust” or a “calculative trust” definition. Not all academicians
agree on such a definition. Outside the realm of economics, trust is mainly considered
a non-calculative decision.
Recent literature on trust has been rapidly growing with the contributions of re-
searchers from different branches of social science. In most of those analysis, researchers
try to identify the impacts of trust by using some measures of the trust from surveys.
Generally, much of the trust research relies upon the survey question ”Generally speak-
ing, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?” in the General Social Survey(GSS)/World Values Survey (WVS).
The survey is aimed to understand the evidence on trust and social capital and also
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bears interesting results. It is worthwhile to overview the previous works and results in
order to understand the trust issue and its determinants and impacts.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) used GSS data for the U.S. for the years 1974-1994
and showed that on average, 40 percent of people respond the question in the survey
”most people can be trusted” and the trend is generally decreasing from 1970 to 1980
and 1990. Scandinavian countries has the highest trust level while the lowest trust
levels are in Latin American countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny
(1997)). 1 Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, Soutter (2000) finds that on average, rich
and well educated people are more likely to trust, college graduates more 30 percent
respond the question as ”most people can be trusted” than the high school dropouts
while white people are more than 21 percent more likely to say yes to the trust question
than blacks.2
As Coleman (1990) argues, familiarity between people promotes trust most of
research on trust try to investigate the effects of heterogeneity/homogeneity on trust.
La Ferrara and Alesina (2000) report effects of heterogeneity variables such as Gini
index, race, and ethnicity on trust. They found that trust is negatively and significantly
correlated with all three measures of heterogeneity. They also showed that income
inequality has a negative impact on trust: ”an increase in Gini by one standard deviation
decreases the likelihood of trust by 2.5 percentage points”. They also reported that the
states with the highest trust levels are homogenous in ethnicity and race, also income
inequality is very low in those states, on the other hand, states with the lowest level
of trust have a fragmented population with a great variation in ethnicity and race and
very high income inequality.
In addition to the descriptive statistics and the determinants of trust, it is worth-
while to pay attention to the impacts of the trust on economic and political activities.
Slemrod and Katuscak (2002) states that ”In high-trust societies, individuals need to
spend less resources to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transac-
tions.” They study a transaction game and find a connection between trust and trust-
worthiness: in societies where trustworthiness is low, trust does not pay off, on the
other hand, trust pays off more in societies where trustworthiness is higher. They also
use WVS data between years of 1990 and 1993 in 18 countries. Their empirical results
show that trust increases individuals’ income in most countries.3 Knack and Keefer
1La porta et al. used the WVS data for the years 1980-1990.
2Glaeser et al. use the GSS data for U.S.
3In fact, they suggest that trust increases income if average trustworthiness is high
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(1997) used the WVS data of 1981 and 1990 a cross-section of 29 countries to show
that people are more likely to innovate and accumulate physical and human capital
in the existence of a high level of trust in their country, therefore, the economy grow
more rapidly. An extension of Knack and Keefer (1997) is the work of Zak and Knack
(2000). They conclude that trust has a positive effect on growth. Uslaner (2002 and
forthcoming) identifies the relationship between economic inequality and trust. Uslaner
(forthcoming) states that people ”Economic equality promotes both optimism and the
belief that we all have a shared fate, across races, ethnic groups, and classes.” Economic
inequality is an important predictor of trust, moreover, decreases trust (Uslaner (2002)).
As Gini index increases, trust declines: trust is 21 percent higher in Switzerland than
South Africa (Uslaner, forthcoming). In addition to trust’s effects on economic activity,
several studies in the literature shows that trust has a positive impact on political activ-
ity. In political science, it is showed that trust increases the collective action (e.g., Levi
(1998); Uslaner (2002)) and political and civic participation (Knack and Keefer (1997)).
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) find that, across countries, a
one-standard deviation increase in the measure of trust increases judicial efficiency by
0.7 of a standard deviation and reduces government corruption by 0.3 of a standard
deviation. Putnam (1993) suggests that in the existence of higher civic engagement the
local governments performs more efficiently.4
Trust in people may also be motivated by the formal institutions and organiza-
tions. Formal institutions, including judicial system and some civil organizations like
bureaus, are ways of enforcing formal transactions like contracts, in a possible case of
cheating. As Zak and Knack (2001) argue, a more efficient formal institution promotes
trust in society. In addition to formal institutions, sometimes informal activities may
also be used in order to force people to perform the expected action instead of be-
traying. A betrayed person can apply to civil courts for the enforcement, even hire
the best lawyer while betraying person has the same opportunity to countervail the
enforcement activity. At the same time, as Bac (forthcoming) argues, agents may use
private means of enforcement even illegal activities such as paying gangsters to exercise
threats. All these enforcement and counter-enforcement activities are closely related to
the income levels of individuals since all of them requires resources. If there is a big
gap between agents’ wealth levels, relatively richer ones have more resources to devote
enough. In their data the only exception is Mexico where average trustworthiness is
too low.
4Putnam (1993) uses the Italian data based on cross-regions.
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and are more powerful in the enforcement stage. Therefore, relative wealth or resource
levels determines the enforcement capabilities of agents.
In this paper, we study a model of an economy where agents are homogenous ex-
cept their wealth levels. Unlike the previous works on trust, individual characteristics
such as ethnicity, race, religion, etc. are not included. Wealth is public information. In
the economy, agents are randomly matched to form pairs in which one of the agents take
the role of beneficiary and the other one becomes trustee, with equal probability. Bene-
ficiary starts the transaction by deciding to trust or not for a future delivery of surplus.
Trustee then decides to perform the expected action or betray to grab a proportion of
the surplus. If the trustee betrays, the game extends to enforcement game where ben-
eficiary and trustee devote resources to win the enforcement. Agents do have limited
resources to devote in the enforcement stage: we classify the agents as unconstrained if
they can respond their partners’ enforcement strategies and constrained, otherwise. In
the case of beneficiary wins the enforcement game, in addition to the resources devoted,
the trustee incurs a loss and delivers the surplus he grabbed. However, if trustee wins
the enforcement game, he keeps the surplus while the beneficiary loses the resources he
devoted and the promised surplus.
The equilibrium of the trust game characterizes the trust and betray strategies
of the agents in the economy. The betray and trust decisions are functions of own
resource levels and the matched agents’ resource levels. Constrained agents are more
likely not to trust and be trustworthy while unconstrained agents generally inclined to
both betray and trust. Unconstrained agents are more likely to trust since they have
enough resources for a strong enforcement while relatively poor, constrained, people
are less likely to betray and trust because of the lack of enough resources. There exists
a betray region where trustee in a matched pair in that region always betrays. Betray
region includes poor beneficiaries and relatively rich trustees. Like the betray region,
there also exists a trust region in which in a matched pair, beneficiaries always trust.
All unconstrained beneficiaries are in the trust region since they can stand strongly
against their partners. These two regions also have an intersection where beneficiaries
trust although trustees betray.
The wealth distribution directly determines the trust and betray strategies of
agents. If only one agent’s wealth level increases, it may change the action of that
agent. A continuous increase of a trustworthy agent’s wealth level may change his ac-
tion from performing to betraying, however, it may not be the case all the time. An
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agent who does not trust eventually changes his action from not trusting to trusting
if his wealth increases continuously. Especially, constrained equilibrium resources are
very sensitive to wealth changes since it directly changes the equilibrium resources. On
the other hand, redistribution of wealth in the economy may change the strategies com-
pletely. Specific wealth distributions give clear results about the probability of betray
in the economy: A redistributed wealth concentrated on the betray region increases
the probability of betray to occur while a wealth redistribution which does not assign
any pair in the betray region eliminates the betray in the economy. In a specific wealth
redistribution which assigns equal wealth to all agents in an economy, there exists a
critical mean wealth where all agents betray if the mean wealth is higher than that crit-
ical wealth, performs otherwise. Similarly, a critical wealth level for the trust decision
exists: all agents trust if the mean wealth is higher than the critical wealth, does not
trust otherwise.
Recent theoretical background on trust shows variety. Many scholars developed
new perspectives in order to understand the dynamics of trust. Kreps (1990) presented
a trust game which is based on prisoner’s dilemma framework. In his one-shot ”trust
game”, he concludes that agents always have an incentive to betray, as a result, their
partners not to trust. However, he showed that if game is repeated sufficient times to
develop a repetition among players, trust could occur. Similarly, Harvey S. James Jr.
(2002) develops the Kreps’ work by developing a new model which is an alternative
version of principal-agent problem and principals are able to choose to monitor the
agents instead of only trusting. One of the conclusions he made is that the principal
trust more reliably when he perceives that the agent’ temptation to betray is low.
Bohnet, Frey, Huck (2001) models a stage game in which player 1 decides to trust
or not while player 2 decides to perform or breach. If player 2 breaches the game
extends to litigation stage where agents try to win the trial. In all of these models,
payoffs are exogenously determined, however, in our model payoffs are determined by
the enforcement strategies of agents. Most similar work to our model are Zak and
Knack (2001). They study a model where agents are heterogenous by means of income,
religion, race, etc. Agents are assigned a wealth and have an income for working in
production. In their model, cheating agents punished by formal institutions if they
are detected, in addition to that partners are able to inspect the cheating agents by
devoting time, called diligence. However, their partners do not have the opportunity
to claim that they did not cheat. In Zak and Knack, trust is inversely proportional
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to diligence; the more diligent the individuals, the less trusting they are. One of their
main findings is that wealthy agents are more likely to investigate their partners and
protect their wealth. On the other hand, a higher income decreases the diligence since
the opportunity cost of diligence is higher (one has to forego current consumption to
increase diligence). In addition to that, high income inequality decreases trust while
more egalitarian system promotes it.
In this paper, we extend the model used by Bac (forthcoming). The main dif-
ference is wealth is public information in our setup. Agents have beliefs about their
partners and trust and betray is decided according to their beliefs, however, we allow
agents to know the resources of their partners. Therefore, wealth distribution and mean
wealth has a great importance in Bac’s work. In equilibrium, agents at the lower tail
of the wealth distribution are more trustworthy and less likely to trust while wealthy
people both trust and betray since they have enough resources for the effective en-
forcement. He suggests any mean-preserving wealth distribution decreases the wealth
inequality may not increase trust since in the existence of very wealthy agents in an
economy with low per-capita trust will be positive because of those few wealthy agents
and trustworthiness will also be positive since most of agents have few resources for
countervailing the enforcement. Homogenizing wealth around its low mean may cause
those few wealthy agents to quit trusting. In an economy with sufficiently low per-capita
may result with zero-trust since all agents may be too vulnerable if they trust. How-
ever, full wealth equality provides two equilibria: full-trust occurs when mean wealth
is sufficiently high. On the other hand, in an economy with sufficiently low per-capita
there exists zero-trust equilibria.
The thesis is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model where agents
play a trust game. Section 3 provides the equilibrium of the trust and betray strategies.
A special case of wealth equality is presented in the Section 4. Section 5 summarizes
the results.
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Chapter 2
A Model of Trust and Enforcement
Consider a large economy in which people are classified according to their wealth levels.
Agents‘ wealth levels are common knowledge.
The sequence of events is as follows:
• Agents are randomly matched to form pairs. In each pair, one agent takes the
position of trustee and the other takes the position of beneficiary. Positions are
also randomly determined: each agent is equally likely to assume the role of
trustee.
• Agents play a dynamic “trust game” in which first, the beneficiary decides on
whether to trust the trustee. The game ends if the beneficiary chooses not to
trust.
• If the beneficiary trusts, he incurs a cost x > 0. The trustee decides on whether
to betray trust or perform. If the trustee performs, the game ends.
• If the trustee betrays, the parties play an enforcement game in which they de-
termine simultaneously the resources, the beneficiary to secure performance, the
trustee to avoid performing.
• The binary outcome of the enforcement game is realized and the parties obtain
their final payoffs.
In this economy, the maximal individual wealth is denoted W and we assume that
the minimum wealth level that one can have is x > 0 to ensure that all beneficiaries
7
can trust if they find it in their own interest to do so. The strategies in the overall trust
game are defined as follows:
The beneficiary’s trust strategy maps [x,W ]2 into [0, 1]; that is, assigns to each
given (beneficiary-trustee) wealth combination (wB, wT ) a probability of trusting, de-
noted t(wB, wT ). The trustee’s strategy can be defined similarly. To each given a pair
of wealth levels and a binary realization of trust strategy of the beneficiary, the trustee’s
betray strategy assigns a probability of betrayal, τ . Thus, τ : [x,W ]2 × {0, 1} → [0, 1].
In the enforcement subgame, which is played only if t = 1 and τ = 1 is real-
ized, the beneficiary’s strategy (called enforcement strategy) assigns to the wealth pair
(wB, wT ) a feasible resource RB ∈ [0,W − x]. Similarly the trustee’s strategy (called
counterenforcement strategy) assigns to (wB, wT ) a feasible resource RT ∈ [2x,W + x].
These resources are devoted to exercising threats, on monitoring and investigating the
most effective way of putting pressure on the trustee perform, or paying third parties
to perform these functions. The resources RB and RT jointly determine the binary
outcome of the enforcement subgame. The beneficiary succeeds, meaning that he is in
a position to secure performance, with probability RB
RB+RT
. With probability 1− RB
RB+RT
the trustee “wins” and neutralizes the beneficiary‘s enforcement activity; in this case,
the trustee reaps an extra payoff which we assume is fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of the net
surplus S she owes the beneficiary.
If the beneficiary “wins,” then the trustee is forced to perform and beneficiary
gets the promised surplus S while trustee incurs a loss κ > 0, a possible interpretation
of which is punishment. The probability that the trustee wins, RT
RB+RT
, is increasing in
the trustee’s expenditures on counterenforcement, RT given RB, but it is decreasing in
of RB for given RT constant. The opposite behavior obtains for the probability that
the beneficiary wins. We shall assume that if RB = RT = 0, then each side wins with
probability 0.5. Concerning the terminal payoffs, we assume
(1− α)S > κ > αS and S > x.
The assumption κ > αS rules out the case of ineffective punishment, whereas (1 −
α)S > κ implies that the surplus is large enough so that the trustee may sometimes
betray. An implication of these two assumptions is α < 0.5: the maximum benefit from
betraying trust is less than the half of the entire surplus. The previous assumption also
restricts the punishment. We are only interested with the impacts of marginal changes
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Figure 2.1: Game Tree
in punishment, κ, on results and moreover, a high punishment does not give descriptive
results in our framework. On the other hand, S > x is a minimal requirement; it
ensures that the beneficiary trusts if the trustee does not betray.
The terminal payoffs are as follows:
If the beneficiary does not trust, t = 0, the pair dissolves. Therefore payoffs are
equal to wealth.
uN = wB, v
N = wT .
When the beneficiary trusts (t = 1), the trustee does not betray (τ = 0) and
performs, the beneficiary gets the surplus S > 0 and the game ends. Thus,
uP = wB − x+ S, vP = wT + x.
If, however, the trustee betrays, the parties proceeds to the enforcement subgame, which
has two potential outcomes. If the trustee wins terminal payoffs are:
uE = wB − x−RB, vE = wT + x+ αS −RT .
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If the beneficiary wins terminal payoffs are
uE = wB − x−RB + S, vE = wT + x−RT − κ.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium of the Trust Game
The strategy profile in the trust game {(t, RB), (τ, RT )} must form a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPE). Therefore the enforcement strategies must also form a Nash
equilibrium of the enforcement subgame. In this subgame enforcement strategies must
be mutually best responses. The best response function of beneficiary is obtained by
maximizing the expected payoff,
uM = wB − x+ RB
RB +RT
S −RB,
subject to RB ≤ wB − x, given RT . Ignoring the wealth constraint, the best-response
function of the beneficiary, denoted RB(RT ), must satisfy
RB(RT ) = (RTS)
0.5 −RT , (3.1)
Similarly the trustee’s best response function, denoted RT (RB) maximizes his expected
payoff
vM = wT + x+
RT
RB +RT
αS − RB
RB +RT
κ−RT .
subject to RT ≤ wT +x, given RB. Assuming that the wealth constraint is not binding,
the trustee’s best-response function is
RT (RB) = (RB(κ+ αS))
0.5 −RB. (3.2)
These best-response functions are derived under the assumption that the resource
constraints, given by RB ≤ wB−x for the beneficiary and RT ≤ wT +x for the trustee,
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are not binding. Obviously, if one of the agents wants to devote more than his net
wealth permits, his best choice is to devote entire net wealth on enforcement. We will
say that an agent is constrained if he or she cannot afford the best response of a given
enforcement, or counter-enforcement level. Incorporating the resource constraints, Then
the optimal R∗T will be given by
R∗T =
{
RT (RB) if wT + x ≥ RT (RB);
wT + x if wT + x < RT (RB).
(3.3)
The beneficiary’s optimal R∗B is obtained similarly as:
R∗B =
{
RB(RT ) if wB − x ≥ RB(RT );
wB − x if wT − x < RB(RT ).
(3.4)
We say that agent i is constrained if R∗i exceeds his available wealth at the en-
forcement stage. This available wealth is wB − x for the beneficiary, wT + x for the
trustee. An agent is unconstrained otherwise, if R∗i does not exceed available wealth.
Thus, a constrained agent would prefer to devote any additional wealth to enforcement
or counterenforcement activities whereas an unconstrained agent’s optimal strategy in
the enforcement subgame is insentive to small changes in wealth.
Consider a beneficiary in the enforcement game, given a fixed resource RT which
the trustee devotes to counterenforcement. The beneficiary’s net expected payoff from
marginally increasing his own resource RB is
duM
dRB
=
RTS
(RB +RT )2
− 1.
Rearranging this equation, we find that
duM
dRB
≥ 0 if RB ≤ (RTS)0.5 −RT (3.5)
The beneficiary is constrained given RT if ∂u
M/∂RB > 0 when evaluated at RB =
wB − x; then the optimal enforcement strategy for the beneficiary is R∗B = wB − x, to
devote all of his wealth to enforcement. Similarly, using the net betray payoff of the
trustee, vM for a given RB, we have
dvM
dRT
= −1− (0−RB)κ
(RB +RT )2
+
((RB +RT )−RT )αS
(RB +RT )2
,
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which after arrangements yields the following condition:
dvM
dRT
≥ 0 if RT ≤ (RB(κ+ αS))0.5 −RB. (3.6)
We have a constrained trustee in the enforcement game given RB, if ∂v
M/∂RT evaluated
at RT = wT + x is strictly positive. Such a trustee will devote all his available wealth
to counterenforcement, that is, if R∗T = wT + x.
The best response functions in (3.1) and (3.2) describe the behavior of the un-
constrained levels of R∗i as a function of Rj. These critical resource levels are not
monotonic in Rj; For instance, an increase in RB increases RT (RB) for small amounts
of RB, decreases otherwise. More precisely, from the best response function, we see
that
dRT (RB)
dRB
=
κ+ αS
2(RB(κ+ αS))0.5
− 1 ≥ 0 if and only if RB ≤ (κ+ αS)
4
. (3.7)
On the other hand, we get
dRB(RT )
dRT
=
S
2(RBS)0.5
− 1 ≥ 0 if and only if RT ≤ S
4
. (3.8)
These properties are displayed in Figure 3.1, where the wealth configurations in which
the trustee is constrained are shown as the area lying below the RT (RB) schedule.
Wealth combinations under which the beneficiary is constrained is located to the left
of the RB(RT ) schedule.
An interesting case is the amount of the exogenous variable x, the trust cost
of the beneficiary paid to the trustee. An increase in x, decreases the resources of
the beneficiary and increases the resources of the trustee in the enforcement game.
Therefore, for higher values of x, beneficiary is more likely to be constrained and trustee
is more likely to be unconstrained. However, x does not change the optimal strategies
when both agents are unconstrained, unless making the beneficiary constrained.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to recall the main assumption
made so far:
(1− α)S > κ > αS and S > x > 0
.
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Figure 3.1: Best Response Functions and the Unconstrained Equilibrium
3.1 Analysis of the Enforcement Subgame
Given a matched pair with resources (wEB , w
E
T ) ∈ [x,W ]2, an equilibrium of the enforce-
ment subgame is a pair of resources (R∗B, R
∗
T ) ∈ [0,W − x] × [2x,W + x] satisfying
(3.3) and (3.4). It is useful to study separately the equilibria according to the status
of the wealth constraints, that is, for the case in which the resource constraints are not
binding, and the cases in which they are binding only for one or both of the parties.
An enforcement subgame equilibrium exists and is unique.
Let us start with the game in which both agents are unconstrained. The Nash
Equilibrium pair of resources are obtained as solutions to (3.1) and (3.2)1:
R∗B =
(κ+ αS)S2
(κ+ αS + S)2
R∗T =
(κ+ αS)2S
(κ+ αS + S)2
(3.9)
The following result locates the unconstrained equilibrium, displayed in Figure 3.1:
Lemma 1 (i) The maximal best response RT (RB) of the trustee is greater than the
Nash equilibrium resource R∗T . Moreover, R
∗
T < (κ+ αS)/4.
(ii) The maximal best response RB(RT ) of the beneficiary is greater than Nash equilib-
1See the Appendix
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rium resource R∗B. Moreover, R
∗
B < S/4.
Proof.
(i) The maximum value of RT (RB) can be found by solving the equation
dRT (RB)
RB
=
(κ+ αS)0.5
2R0.5B
− 1 = 0,
R0.5B =
(κ+ αS)0.5
2
that is, RB = (κ+ αS)/4.
Substituting this RB into the best response function RT (RB), we get
RT (RB) =
(κ+ αS)0.5(κ+ αS)0.5
2
− (κ+ αS)
4
=
(κ+ αS)
4
.
Using the expression of the Nash equilibrium in R∗T < (κ+ αS)/4 yields:
R∗T < (κ+ αS)/4⇒
(κ+ αS)2S
(κ+ αS + S)2
< (κ+ αS)/4,
which implies
4S(κ+ αS) < (κ+ αS + S)2, or, 0 < (κ+ αS − S)2,
which follows from the assumption S > (κ+ αS).
(ii) As in part (i), the maximum value of RB(RT ) is given by the following equation
dRB(RT )
RT
=
S0.5
2R0.5T
− 1 = 0
R0.5T =
S0.5
2
RT = S/4
The same procedure as in (i) yields
RB(RT ) =
S0.5S0.5
2
− S
4
=
S
4
.
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Using the expression of the Nash equilibrium in R∗B < S/4 we get:
(κ+ αS)S2
(κ+ αS + S)2
< S/4⇒ 4S(κ+ αS) < (κ+ αS)2 + 2S(κ+ αS) + S2,
⇒ 0 < (κ+ αS − S)2,
which holds because S > (κ+ αS).
Q.E.D.
When one of the two parties is constrained, that is, when R∗i in (3.9) exceeds agent
i’s available resources, in the Nash equilibrium this agent will devote all his available
resources, to which the unconstrained party will respond optimally according to his
best response function. So, when the beneficiary is constrained but the trustee is not,
the Nash Equilibrium is given by
R∗B = wB − x R∗T = [(wB − x)(κ+ αS)]0.5 − wB + x, (3.10)
such that
∂uM(R∗B, R
∗
T )
∂RB
> 0 and
∂vM(R∗B, R
∗
T )
∂RT
= 0.
Similarly, when the trustee is constrained while the beneficiary is not, the Nash
Equilibrium is
R∗T = wT + x R
∗
B = ((wT + x)S)
0.5 − wT − x (3.11)
such that
∂uM(R∗B, R
∗
T )
∂RB
= 0 and
∂vM(R∗B, R
∗
T )
∂RT
> 0.
Both of these partial derivatives will be strictly positive when both agents are con-
strained; then the Nash equilibrium is
R∗T = wT + x R
∗
B = wB − x. (3.12)
The Nash equilibrium of the enforcement subgame (R∗B, R
∗
T ) will change as the
surplus S or the punishment κ changes, provided the resource constraint is not binding.
In the Appendix we show that when both sides are unconstrained, an increase in S leads
the beneficiary and the trustee to increase the resources they devote to enforcement and
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counter-enforcement, that is,
dR∗T
dS
> 0,
dR∗B
dS
> 0.
An increase in the surplus means a larger resource to compete for. As a result, both
the beneficiary and the trustee will increase their Nash equilibrium resources (R∗B, R
∗
T ),
to raise their chances from the larger surplus.2 If one of the parties is constrained in
the enforcement subgame, a small change in S will have no effect on his enforcement
strategy; but the unconstrained party will, as mentioned above, increase R∗i .
The impact of an increase in the punishment for the betray is different. If κ
increases, the trustee will respond by increasing the resource he devotes to counter-
enforcement because, if he betrays he faces a larger cost in case the beneficiary wins
the enforcement game. Given this change in the trustee’s behavior, the beneficiary will
also modify his enforcement strategy. He, too, will increase the amount he spends for
the enforcement, if the surplus is sufficiently large such that (1− α)S > κ.
If the trustee is constrained, a small increase in κ will have no effect on the
equilibrium outcome, because the change in the equilibrium resources comes through
its effect on the trustee’s equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, if it the beneficiary
who is constrained while the trustee is not, R∗B is constant but R
∗
T will increase.
3.2 The Equilibrium of the Overall Trust Game
We now probe into the overall trust game, which includes trust and betray decisions
plus the potential enforcement subgame. One step before the enforcement subgame
is the trustee’s betray decision if the beneficiary trusts. The trustee betrays if his
corresponding payoff is larger than the sure payoff he gets from performing, wT + x.
At this stage the optimal strategy of the trustee is to set τ = 1 and betray if, given
the Nash equilibrium R∗ = (R∗B, R
∗
T ) of the enforcement subgame to which the betray
decision leads, the following net betray payoff is positive:
v(R∗) = −R∗T +
R∗T
R∗B +R
∗
T
αS − R
∗
B
R∗B +R
∗
T
κ ≥ 0. (3.13)
v(R∗) is decreasing in RB and, as expected, a larger surplus share αS or a smaller
2R∗T exceeds only if α is sufficiently large, for small values of α, R
∗
T may decrease.
Also see Lemma 5
17
punishment κ enhances incentives to betray.
Consider now the beneficiary’s trust strategy. The beneficiary’s net expected
payoff from trust is stated below, given the trustee’s betray strategy τ and the Nash
equilibrium R∗ = (R∗B, R
∗
T ) of the enforcement subgame to which the betray decision
leads.
u(R∗, τ) = −x+ τ( R
∗
B
R∗B +R
∗
T
S −R∗B) + (1− τ)S. (3.14)
The beneficiary’s optimal strategy is to set t = 1 and trust if the expected payoff in
(3.14) is strictly positive. Note that both v(R∗) and u(R∗, τ) depend on the wealth
combination because R∗ is a function of w = (wB, wT ).
A SPE of the overall trust game, denoted {t∗, τ ∗, R∗B, R∗T}, is a collection of trust
and betray/perform strategies for each agent, as well as enforcement and counter-
enforcement strategies in the enforcement subgame. Lemma 2 describes the trustee’s
optimal betray-perform response when the beneficiary trusts, according to status of
wealth constraints. Note that part (i) of the lemma holds irrespective of whether the
trustee is unconstrained or constrained.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the beneficiary trusts.
(i) If the beneficiary is unconstrained, the trustee does not betray.
(ii) If the beneficiary is constrained but the trustee is not, the trustee betrays if and only
if wB − x < 2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + καS)0.5 ≡ R¯B.
Proof. (i) The proof is divided in two parts, according to whether the trustee is
constrained or not. Assume, first, that both parties are unconstrained. Using (R∗B, R
∗
T )
defined by (3.9) in (3.13) we get
v(R∗B, R
∗
T ) = −
S
S + κ+ αS
κ+
κ+ αS
κ+ αS + S
αS − S(κ+ αS)
2
(κ+ αS + S)2
The net betray payoff can be arranged and simplified as follows:
v(R∗B, R
∗
T ) =
−S(κ+ αS + S)κ+ (κ+ αS)αS(κ+ αS + S)− S(κ+ αS)2
(κ+ αS + S)2
< 0
−S(κ+ αS + S)κ+ (κ+ αS)αS(κ+ αS + S)− S(κ+ αS)2 < 0
(κ+ αS)αS(κ+ αS + S) < S(κ+ αS + S)κ+ S(κ+ αS)2
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(κ+ αS)(αS(κ+ αS + S)− Sκ− S(κ+ αS)) < S2κ.
Note that (αS(κ+ αS + S)− Sκ− S(κ+ αS)) < 0 because
αSκ+ (αS)2 + αSS − Sκ− Sκ− αSS < 0 implies (α− 1)Sκ+ ((αS)2 − Sκ) < 0,
where the first term is negative by α < 1 and the second term is negative by κ > αS.
Thus, v(R∗B, R
∗
T ) < 0.
Assume, now, that the trustee is constrained by his resource RT . Since the ben-
eficiary is unconstrained, the Nash equilibrium will lie on beneficiary’s best-response
function RB(RT ). Using this fact, the net betray payoff is
v(RB(RT ), RT ) = R
0.5
T
(κ+ αS)
S0.5
− κ−RT .
We show that this net betray payoff is negative even if the trustee could devote his best
response to RB. The value of RT that maximizes the net betray payoff above satisfies
the following first-order condition:
d(v(RB(RT ), RT ))
dRT
= 0.5
κ+ αS
R0.5T S
0.5
− 1
which yields
RT =
(κ+ αS)2
4S
.
Substituting this RT into the net betray payoff yields:
v(RB(RT ), RT ) =
(κ+ αS)
2S0.5
(κ+ αS)
S0.5
− κ− (κ+ αS)
2
4S
which is negative if
(κ+ αS)2
2S
− (κ+ αS)
2
4S
− κ < 0 or if (κ+ αS)
2
4S
− κ < 0,
which reduces to (κ+αS)2 < 4Sκ. This inequality holds by the assumption (1−α)S >
κ > αS, which implies S > κ+αS and 4κ > κ+αS. The proof of part (i) is complete.
(ii) When the beneficiary is constrained but the trustee is not, the former’s best
counterenforcement responseR∗B is smaller than his available wealth. Using the trustee’s
unconstrained enforcement best response R∗T = (RB(κ + αS))
0.5 − RB, his net betray
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payoff in (3.13) can be written as:
v(RB, RT (RB)) = −2(RB(κ+ αS))0.5 +RB + αS for a given RB. (3.15)
The betray payoff function in (3.15) is the trustee’s payoff along his best-response curve.
It is decreasing in the beneficiary’s resource RB if
1− 2(κ+ αS)
0.5
2R0.5B
< 0, or if RB < κ+ αS.
There exists a critical resource level R˜B = κ + αS which minimizes the betray payoff
of the trustee in (3.15). We note that R˜B is larger than the resource R
∗
B which the
unconstrained beneficiary puts in the unconstrained Nash equilibrium. In fact,
κ+ αS > R∗B =
(κ+ αS)S2
(κ+ αS + S)2
because S2 < (κ+ αS + S)2.
Because the beneficiary is constrained, RB = wB − x < R∗B < R˜B. It follows that
the trustee’s betray payoff is declining along his best-response curve as RB is increased
towards the unconstrained Nash equilibrium point.
The betray payoff in (3.15) is strictly positive if 4RBκ < (αS−RB)2, which clearly
holds as RB → 0 and therefore the trustee betrays if the constrained beneficiary’s
resources are small enough. The betray payoff has two roots, of which the smaller one
is relevant:3
R¯B = 2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + αSκ)0.5. (3.16)
The betray payoff is positive for RB < R¯B, negative for larger values of RB in
the relevant range. Thus, the trustee betrays if RB = wB − x < R¯B, which yields the
condition stated in the lemma.
Q.E.D.
3Setting v(RB) = 0, we get 2(RB(κ + αS))
0.5 = RB + αS. Taking the squares of
both sides and arranging the terms yields R2B − RB(4κ + 2αS) + (αS)2 = 0. Solving
this equation for RB yields the two roots,
RB1 = 2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + καS)0.5 and RB2 = 2κ+ αS + 2(κ2 + καS)0.5.
See the Appendix
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Lemma 2 part (i) requires the assumption (1− α)S > κ > αS, which is unlikely
to hold if α is 0.5 or larger. If this assumption does not hold, then a trustee playing
against an unconstrained beneficiary can choose to betray trust; the intuition is that
the share he gets from the surplus is sufficiently large, so, even if the trustee is not as
resourceful as the beneficiary, he may find it worthwhile to risk betraying trust.
Lemma 2 does not cover the trustee’s betray response in the case in which both
sides are constrained−shown by the lens-shaped area between the best-response func-
tions in Figure 3.2. We focus below on this case, where RT = wT +x and RB = wB−x
such that the parties’ expected marginal payoffs in the enforcement subgame are strictly
increasing in wT and wB respectively. That is (3.5) and (3.6) evaluated at RT = wT +x
and RB = wB − x hold with strict inequality:
wT + wB < [(wT + x)S]
0.5 and wT + wB < [(wB − x)(κ+ αS)]0.5 (3.17)
where wB ≥ x and wT ≥ x. Alternatively, (3.17) can be expressed in terms of the
resources available in the enforcement subgame:
RT +RB < [RTS]
0.5 and RT +RB < [RB(κ+ αS)]
0.5, (3.18)
where RB ≥ 0 and RT ≥ 2x.
When the wealth combination satisfies (3.17)−equivalently, when the resource
combination satisfies (3.18)−we have a constrained equilibrium and, if trusted, the
trustee’s net betray payoff is given by:
v(w) =
(wT + x)αS − (wT + x)(wB + wT )− (wB − x)κ
wB + wT
, or
v(R) =
RTαS −RBκ
RB +RT
−RT
in terms of the resources. It can be shown that v(w) and v(R) are decreasing in the
beneficiary’s wealth wB and resources RB, respectively.
We define the locus ρB(RT ) through the zero-betray-payoff condition v(R) = 0,
which delivers a resource for the beneficiary such that the trustee is indifferent between
betraying and performing given his resources RT . Thus,
ρB(RT ) =
{
RTαS−(RT )2
κ+RT
if RT (R¯B) ≥ 2x;
R¯B if RT (R¯B) < 2x.
(3.19)
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Figure 3.2: Betray and Trust Locus: the betray region is the shaded area which lies
left of the betray locus,ρB(RT ).
Given his resources RT , the trustee betrays if the beneficiary’s resource RB is
smaller than ρB(RT ) and performs otherwise. The locus ρB(RT ) is shown in the resource
space by the bold convex curve until the trustee’s best response curve and the region
in which the trustee betrays is given by the shaded area in Figure 3.2 (where the left
hand side of (3.19) exceeds the right hand side.) As the resources of the beneficiary
increases, the betray payoff decreases and eventually leads to a switch in the trustee’s
decision from betray to perform.
As we move along the ρB(RT ) locus, that is, as RT approaches (RB(αS+κ))
0.5−
RB, eventually we hit the intersection of ρB(RT ) and the trustee’s best response function
RT (RB).
4 At the intersection, the beneficiary is constrained and is indifferent between
4To see this, we can write the condition (3.19) where we let RT → (RB(αS+κ))0.5−
RB as
RB =
((RB(αS + κ))
0.5 −RB)(αS)− ((RB(αS + κ))0.5 −RB)2
κ+ (RB(αS + κ))0.5 −RB .
Rearranging this condition leads at once to 4(RB(κ + αS)) = (αS + RB)
2, which has
as solution RB = R¯B, defined in Lemma 2 as a critical resource of the beneficiary such
that the unconstrained trustee is indifferent between betraying and performing.
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betraying and performing, while the trustee gives the best unconstrained enforcement
response. As shown in Figure 3.2, the resource combinations under which both sides are
constrained and the trustee betrays if trusted is a lens-shaped subset. Below we derive
a necessary condition for existence of a “betray region” within the set of constrained
pairs of resources.
As mentioned, (RB, RT ) = (0, 2x) is not a resource combination under which
both sides are constrained; the beneficiary is constrained but the trustee is not. If RB
is increased while RT is fixed at 2x, the net betray payoff falls. The trustee will also
become constrained as his best response curve is reached and continues to betray if
trusted at low levels of RB. When a critical beneficiary resource R
′
B is reached such
that v(R′B, 2x) = 0, the trustee, constrained, becomes indifferent between betraying
and performing. A resource R′B ∈ (0, R¯B) satisfying the trustee’s indifference condition
R′B + 2x = [R
′
B(κ+ αS)]
0.5 exists if
2x < RT (R¯B), (3.20)
where R¯B is defined in the proof of Lemma 2 as the critical beneficiary resource which
makes the trustee indifferent between betraying and performing when the trustee is not
constrained. Obviously Condition (3.20) holds if x is relatively small.
We now move to the initial stage of the overall game and study the beneficiary’s
trust decision. The trust game ends if the beneficiary does not trust; in that case
his expected net payoff in (3.14) is negative. This constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if in
addition to the beneficiary does not trust, trustee decides to betray if trusted. However,
this Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated when beneficiary trusts, therefore, we do not
pay attention to this equilibrium. Moreover, the game proceeds to the trustee‘s betray-
perform decision. Lemma 3 describes the beneficiary‘s optimal trust decision in all
wealth combinations.
Lemma 3 (i) The unconstrained beneficiary always trusts.
(ii) If the trustee is unconstrained and betrays whereas the beneficiary is constrained,
the beneficiary trusts if and only if wB − x > RˆB, where RˆB is the root of the net
zero-trust payoff u(R∗, τ) = 0 in (3.14), that is,
RˆB =
S2 − 2x(αS + κ)− (S2 − 4x(αS + κ))0.5
2(αS + κ)
.
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Proof. (i) It is obvious that in any SPE, the beneficiary trusts if the trustee does not
betray. In (3.14), if τ = 0, the expected payoff from trust is positive, so the beneficiary
sets t = 1. In that case, the beneficiary‘s net trust payoff is u(R) = S − x and since
S > x, he gets a net positive payoff.
(ii) Assume that the beneficiary is constrained but the trustee is not. Using the trustee’s
unconstrained enforcement best response R∗T = (RB(κ+αS))
0.5−RB, the beneficiary’s
net trust payoff in (3.14) can be written as:
u(RB, RT (RB)) = R
0.5
B
S
(αS + κ)0.5
−RB − x. (3.21)
The payoff in (3.21) is the beneficiary’s trust payoff along the trustee’s best-response
curve. We have
duM
dRB
≥ 0, if RB ≤ S
2
4(κ+ αS)
.
The maximand of the trust payoff (3.21) is unique and denoted R˘B =
S2
4(κ+αS)
. We note
that R˘B is larger than the resource R
∗
B which the unconstrained beneficiary puts in the
unconstrained Nash equilibrium. In fact,
S2
4(κ+ αS)
> R∗B =
(κ+ αS)S2
(κ+ αS + S)2
because S < (κ+ αS).
Because the beneficiary is constrained, RB = wB − x < R∗B < R˘B. It follows that
the beneficiary’s trust payoff is increasing along trustee‘s best-response curve as RB is
increased towards the unconstrained Nash equilibrium point. On the other hand, the
trust payoff in (3.21) is strictly negative if RBS
2 ≤ (RB + x)2(κ+ αS). This condition
clearly holds as RB → 0, therefore, the beneficiary does not trust if his resources are
small enough. The trust payoff never turns positive and the beneficiary never trusts if
S2 < 4x(κ + αS), given that trust will be betrayed. However, if S2 ≥ 4x(κ + αS) the
zero-trust payoff has two real roots, of which the smaller one is relevant:5
5Setting u(RB) = 0, we get R
0.5
B S = (κ+αS)
0.5(RB +x). Taking the squares of both
sides and arranging the terms yields (αS+κ)R2B−(S2−2x(αS+κ))RB+x2(αS+κ) = 0.
Solving this equation for RB yields the two roots (See the Appendix),
RB1 =
S2 − 2x(αS + κ)− ((S2 − 2x(αS + κ))2 − 4x2(αS + κ)2)0.5
2(αS + κ)
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RˆB =
S2 − 2x(αS + κ)− ((S4 − 4xS2(αS + κ))0.5
2(αS + κ)
.
the trust payoff is negative, hence the beneficiary does not trust, if and only if RB =
wB − x < RˆB, which yields the condition stated in the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 covers the trust decision of the beneficiary in all wealth combinations
except the case in which both agents are constrained. In that region, both agents
wealths and, equivalently, their resources, must satisfy (3.17) and (3.18), respectively,
where the beneficiary’s net trust payoff is (for τ = 1 and assuming the trustee betrays)
u(w, 1) =
−x(wB + wT ) + (wB − x)S − (wB − x)(wB + wT )
wB + wT
, or
u(R, 1) =
RB(S − x)− xRT
RB +RT
−RB
It can be shown that u(w, 1) and u(R, 1) are decreasing in the trustee’s wealth
wT and resources RT , respectively. We define the locus ρT (RB) through u(R, 1) =
u(R, 0) = 0, to determine the critical trustee resource that makes the beneficiary indif-
ferent between trusting and not trusting for each given resource RB of the beneficiary:
ρT (RB) =
RB(S − x)−R2B
RB + x
(3.22)
The constrained beneficiary trusts if and only if RT < ρT (RB). The locus ρT (RB)
is shown in Figure 3.2 by the bold concave dashed curve; to its left lies the region in
which the beneficiary does not trust. Pick a resource combination in the no trust region
and increase the beneficiary’s resources, keeping those of the trustee constant. The net
trust payoff will increase and eventually turn positive, in which case the beneficiary‘s
action switches from not trusting to trust. As we move along the ρT (RB) locus, that is,
as RT approaches (RB(αS + κ))
0.5 − RB, eventually we hit the intersection of ρT (RB)
RB2 =
S2 − 2x(αS + κ) + ((S2 − 2x(αS + κ))2 − 4x2(αS + κ)2)0.5
2(αS + κ)
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and the trustee’s best response function RT (RB).
6
The comparison between R¯B and RˆB is an important issue but unfortunately
analytically difficult. Magnitudes of parameters such as κ, α, x, and S determines the
relative positions of these two critical resource levels. In Figure 3.2, there are two dashed
lines representing the trust locus. If R¯B ≥ RˆB, then the steeper dashed line represents
the trust locus and two loci intersect each other so that there exists a region in which
the beneficiary trusts although the trustee betrays. In this case, the intersection of two
regions is larger and number of agents who trust if their partners betray is greater. On
the other hand, if R¯B ≤ RˆB, flatter dashed line represents the trust locus and we still
have such a region; however, the intersection is smaller now.
Until now, we analyzed the overall ”Trust Game”. First of all, we specified the
best response functions RB(RT ) and RT (RB) given by the equations (3.1) and (3.2),
respectively. We characterized the equilibrium of the enforcement game {R∗B, R∗T}.
Then, we characterized the betray decision of trustee in detail and summarized it in
the lemma 2. In a case where the beneficiary is constrained but the trustee is not, if
wB−x < R¯B, the trustee betrays, where R¯B is given by the equation (3.16). In the case
where both agents are constrained, there exists a betray locus ρB(RT ) (equation (3.19))
under some conditions. Finally, we characterized the trust decision of beneficiary which
is given by lemma 3. Similar to betray locus, we find a trust locus, ρT (RB), (equation
(3.22)) when both agents are constrained. Now, we are ready to define the betray
and trust decisions of the trustee and the beneficiary, respectively. The first part of the
proposition below states the conditions under which the beneficiary trusts; it determines
a trust region in which, for all matched pairs in that region, beneficiaries trust. The
second part of the proposition deals with the betray decision of the trustee and draws
the boundaries of the betray region.
Proposition 1 (i) The beneficiary trusts if RB ≥ RB(RT ) or RB ≥ ρB(RT ) or RT ≤
6To verify that ρT (RB) = RT (RB) as RT converges to (RB(αS + κ))
0.5 − RB, write
the condition (3.22) where RT → (RB(αS + κ))0.5 −RB as
(RB(αS + κ))
0.5 −RB = RB(S − x)−R
2
B
RB + x
Rearranging this condition leads at once to (αS + κ)(RB + x)
2 = RBS, which has as
solution RB = RˆB, defined in Lemma 3 as a critical resource of a constrained beneficiary
when he is indifferent between trusting and not trusting, matched with a unconstrained
trustee.
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ρT (RB).
(ii) The trustee betrays if RB ≤ ρB(RT ).
Proof.
(i) The beneficiary trusts if the expected net trust payoff is non-negative. The
condition RB ≥ RB(RT ) corresponds to the case where the beneficiary is unconstrained.
Lemma 2 states that in such a condition trustee never betrays and first part in lemma
3 suggests that the beneficiary trusts. RB ≥ ρB(RT )orRB ≥ ρT (RB) specifies the
conditions that a constrained the beneficiary trusts. The ambiguity results from the
fact that the relative positions of R¯B and RˆB to each other is not known. If R¯B > RˆB,
RB ≥ ρB(RT ) is irrelevant since the beneficiary’s expected net trust payoff is non-
negative even though the trustee betrays and in that case lemma 3 suggests that the
beneficiary trusts. However, R¯B < RˆB, then the betray locus and trust locus intersect at
one point where both agents are constrained. In this case, both equations are relevant.
Then, lemmas 2 and 3 suggests that the beneficiary trusts.
(ii) This part is straightforward. The trustee decides to betray if the expected
net betray payoff is non-negative. Lemma 2 suggests that the trustee never betrays to
an unconstrained beneficiary. The condition RB ≤ ρB(RT ) specifies the betray region
since in that region the beneficiary is constrained and the expected net betray payoff
is non-negative.
Q.E.D.
The analysis above showed that there exists a betray region in which in a matched
trustee-beneficiary pair, betray occurs and the game proceeds to the enforcement sub-
game. If betray occurs in a transaction, it results with loss of resources which reduces
the welfare. So, somehow, the size of the betray region displays the welfare loss in a
society: if the betray region expands, then the welfare loss is growing. Therefore, the
analysis of the size of the betray region gains importance. The size of the betray region
can be reduced or enlarged by using the parameters. Below, we study the size of the
betray region by using the parameters such as α, S, and κ.
Let us start with the behavior of the best response functions, (RB(RT ), RT (RB)),
with possible changes in the parameters. The best responses of the beneficiary and the
trustee are functions of each other’s resources and model parameters. A change in the
resource level of one party changes the matched party‘s best response. Also, a change
in parameters can create different results in the best response functions of both parties.
The following lemma clearly reflects the effects of possible changes of parameters on
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best response functions.
Lemma 4 (i)RB(RT ) is increasing in S and independent from κ and α.
(ii) RT (RB) is increasing in S, κ, and α.
Proof.
(i) The best response of the beneficiary is given by equation (3.1). By taking
the first derivatives of the best response function, we can easily reach some conclusions
about its behavior. First of all take the derivative with respect to S.
∂RB(RT )
∂S
=
∂((RTS)
0.5 −RT )
∂S
∂RB(RT )
∂S
=
R0.5T
2S0.5
≥ 0.
Now, we take the derivative of RB(RT ) with respect to α and κ, however, since
RB(RT ) is not functions of α and κ we can immediately see that they are equal to zero.
∂RB(RT )
∂S
=
∂RB(RT )
∂S
= 0.
(ii) The trustees’ best response function is given in equation (3.2). The derivatives
of the best response function of the trustee can give us some conclusions about the
parameters effects. Let us start with taking the derivative with respect to S:
∂RT (RB)
∂S
=
∂((RB(κ+ αS))
0.5 −RB)
∂S
∂RT (RB)
∂S
=
R0.5B α
2(κ+ αS)0.5
≥ 0.
Now, take the derivative with respect to κ:
∂RT (RB)
∂κ
=
∂((RB(κ+ αS))
0.5 −RB)
∂κ
∂RT (RB)
∂κ
=
R0.5B
2(κ+ αS)0.5
≥ 0.
Finally, take the derivative with respect to α:
∂RT (RB)
∂α
=
∂((RB(κ+ αS))
0.5 −RB)
∂α
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∂RT (RB)
∂α
=
R0.5B S
2(κ+ αS)0.5
≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
In this lemma, the change in the best response functions corresponds to shifts in
best response functions. An increase in the best response functions corresponds to a up-
ward shift for the trustee’s best response and a rightward shift for the beneficiary’s best
response: in a sense that the resources devoted for the enforcement game is increasing
in all levels of other agent’s resource level.
Now, we are ready to analyze the behavior of the equilibrium {R∗B, R∗T} when one
of the parameters changes. It is expected that an increase in the surplus has a positive
effect on both R∗B and R
∗
T . When the surplus increases, both expected net trust payoff
and expected net betray payoff are increasing, therefore, the trustee and the beneficiary
have stronger incentives to devote more resources in order to win the enforcement game
and grab the higher surplus. The following lemma describes the effects of changes in
parameters on the unconstrained equilibrium of the enforcement game.
Lemma 5 (i) R∗B is increasing in α, κ, and S.
(ii) R∗T is increasing in α, κ; however, the effect of surplus is ambiguous.
Proof.
(i) The amount of resources that an unconstrained beneficiary devotes in equilib-
rium is given by the equation (3.9). The effects of the parameters can be characterized
by taking the derivatives of R∗B. First, we start with the effect of a possible change in
S on R∗B.
∂R∗B
∂S
=
(2S(κ+ αS) + S2α)(κ+ αS + S)2 − 2S2(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)(α + 1)
(κ+ αS + S)4
≥ 0
(κ+ αS + S)((2S(κ+ αS) + S2α)(κ+ αS + S)− 2S2(κ+ αS)(α + 1)) ≥ 0
(2Sκ+ 3αS2)(κ+ αS + S) ≥ (2S2κ+ 2αS3)(α + 1)
2Sκ2 + 2καS2 + 2κS2 + 3ακS2 + 3α2S3 + 3αS3 ≥ 2ακS2 + 2α2S3 + 2κS2 + 2αS3
3καS2 + 2Sκ2 + α2S3 + αS3 ≥ 0.
Now, take the derivative with respect to κ
∂R∗B
∂κ
=
S2(κ+ αS + S)2 − 2S2(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)
(κ+ αS + S)4
≥ 0
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S2(κ+ αS + S)((κ+ αS + S)− 2(κ+ αS)) ≥ 0
(κ+ αS + S)− 2(κ+ αS) = S − (κ+ αS) ≥ 0⇒ S ≥ κ+ αS.
Last, take the derivative with respect to α
∂R∗B
∂α
=
S3(κ+ αS + S)2 − 2S3(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)
(κ+ αS + S)4
S3(κ+ αS + S)((κ+ αS + S)− 2(κ+ αS)) ≥ 0
(κ+ αS + S)− 2(κ+ αS) = S − (κ+ αS) ≥ 0⇒ S ≥ κ+ αS.
(ii) Similarly, an unconstrained trustee devotes R∗T , given by equation (3.9). Take
the derivative with respect to α in order find its effect on R∗T .
∂R∗T
∂α
=
2S2(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)2 − 2S2(κ+ αS)2(κ+ αS + S)
(κ+ αS + S)4
≥ 0
2S2(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)((κ+ αS + S)− (κ+ αS)) ≥ 0
(κ+ αS + S)− (κ+ αS) ≥ 0⇒ S > 0.
Now, take the derivative with respect to κ
∂R∗T
∂κ
=
2S(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)2 − 2S(κ+ αS)2(κ+ αS + S)
(κ+ αS + S)4
≥ 0
2S(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)((κ+ αS + S)− (κ+ αS)) ≥ 0
(κ+ αS + S)− (κ+ αS) ≥ 0⇒ S > 0.
Finally, we look at the effect of surplus on R∗T . Take the derivative with respect
to S
∂R∗T
∂S
=
(2αS(κ+ αS) + (κ+ αS)2)(κ+ αS + S)2 − 2S(α + 1)(κ+ αS)2(κ+ αS + S)
(κ+ αS + S)4
≥ 0
(κ+ αS)(κ+ αS + S)((κ+ 3αS)(κ+ αS + S)− 2S(α + 1)(κ+ αS)) ≥ 0
(κ+ 3αS)(κ+ αS + S) ≥ 2S(α + 1)(κ+ αS))
κ2 + κS + 4ακS + 3(αS)2 + 3αS2 ≥ 2ακS + 2(αS)2 + 2κS + 2αS2
κ2 + 2ακS + (αS)2 + αS2 ≥ Sκ. (3.23)
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Equation (3.23) does not hold in every case, therefore, the result of S on R∗T is
ambiguous. However, it is obvious that (3.23) does not hold as α → 0. The reason of
a change in the unconstrained equilibrium of the enforcement game is the shifts of the
best response functions. When S increases both of the best response functions shifts
as lemma 4 states. Therefore, the magnitude of the shifts of best response functions
determine the levels of R∗B and R
∗
T . If α is small enough, the shift of the beneficiary’s
best response function exceeds the trustee’s best response function, which results in an
increase in R∗B but a decrease in R
∗
T . In higher α values, this effect disappears and an
increase in S increases both R∗B and R
∗
T .
Q.E.D.
Let us state the intuition behind the previous lemma. As we mentioned, one can
expect that an increase in surplus, S, results in agents devoting more resources in the
enforcement phase since both agents expected net payoffs increase. However, while this
is the case for R∗B, R
∗
T decreases with an increase in S at small values of α. Similarly, an
increase in α directly increases the expected net betray payoff of the trustee because the
betraying trustee can grab a larger portion from the surplus. Lemma 4 states that if α
increases, the best response function of the trustee shifts upward while the beneficiary‘s
best response function is constant. Therefore, the trustee devotes more resources in
every level, and eventually we have a new unconstrained equilibrium where both agents
devote higher resources. Perhaps, the most surprising result of the previous lemma is
the effect of κ on the unconstrained equilibrium. When κ increases, the punishment
imposed on the betraying trustee if he loses the enforcement game increases. As a
result, betraying trustees should devote higher resources to win the enforcement game
and avoid paying the higher punishment. The trustee’s best response function shifts
upward if κ increases, that is, the trustee devotes more resources in every level. Even
though the beneficiary’s best response stays constant, the shift in trustee’s best response
results with a new unconstrained equilibrium where both R∗B and R
∗
T are higher.
The other important variable in determining the size of the betray region is R¯B
since it determines the critical RB level: a constrained beneficiary whose resources are
smaller than R¯B is betrayed by an unconstrained trustee. Also, as we mentioned, if
we move along the ρB(RT ) locus, that is, as RT approaches (RB(αS + κ))
0.5 − RB,
eventually we hit the intersection of ρB(RT ) and the trustee’s best response function
RT (RB): this is the resource level R¯B. Therefore, for an accurate analysis of the betray
region, R¯B plays an important role: keeping everything constant a right shift of R¯B,
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shifts the betray locus and increases the betray region. The following lemma studies
the behavior of R¯B for possible changes in the model parameters.
Lemma 6 R¯B increases in α and S and decreases in κ.
Proof.
Let us start with the effect of α on R¯B. Taking the derivative with respect to α
yields:
∂R¯B
∂α
=
∂(2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + καS)0.5)
∂α
∂R¯B
∂α
= S − 2κS
2(κ2 + καS)0.5
≥ 0
2S(κ2 + καS)0.5 ≥ 2κS ⇒ 4S2κ2 + 4S2καS ≥ 4S2κ2 ⇒ 4S2καS ≥ 0
Now, take the derivative with respect to κ
∂R¯B
∂κ
=
∂(2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + καS)0.5)
∂κ
∂R¯B
∂κ
= 2− 2(2κ+ αS)
2(κ2 + καS)0.5
≤ 0
4(κ2 + καS)0.5 ≤ 2(2κ+ αS)⇒ 16κ2 + 16καS ≤ 16κ2 + 16καS + 4(αS)2
⇒ 0 ≤ 4(αS)2
Finally, take the derivative with respect to S
∂R¯B
∂S
=
∂(2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + καS)0.5)
∂S
∂R¯B
∂S
= α− 2ακ
2(κ2 + καS)0.5
≥ 0
2α(κ2 + καS)0.5 ≥ 2ακ⇒ 4α2κ2 + 4α3κS ≥ 4α2κ2 ⇒ 4α3κS ≥ 0
Q.E.D.
The previous lemma summarizes the effects of the changes in parameters when
the beneficiary is constrained. The lemma 2 states that the trustee never betrays to an
unconstrained beneficiary. However, when the beneficiary is constrained, there exists
cases where the trustee betrays and R¯B is the critical point where an unconstrained
trustee is indifferent between betray and perform. Also, as stated above, the betray
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locus covers the case where both agents are constrained; this locus hits the critical level
R¯B as the trustee becomes unconstrained. Therefore, a right shift of R¯B enlarges the
betray locus and increases the number of constrained7 and unconstrained trustees that
betray to constrained beneficiaries.
Previous lemma states that an increase in S and α shifts R¯B to the right. An
increase in both parameters directly increases the expected net betray payoff of the
trustee. Therefore, the trustee may change his action depending on his resources, from
perform to betray. However, if κ increases, then the trustee’s expected net betray payoff
declines and the trustee may change his action from betray to perform.
Until now, we analyzed the effects of parameters on some relevant variables and
best responses for an accurate characterization of the betray region. The size of the
betray region can be reduced or enlarged by using the parameters. The previous three
lemmas express the effects of changes of parameters. We can use these lemmas in order
to adjust the size of the betray region. The following proposition summarizes the effects
of parameters on the betray region.
Proposition 2 The betray region enlarges with S and α and shrinks with κ.
Proof.
The betray region is shown in Figure 3.2 by the shaded area. When α or S
increases, lemma 4 states that the trustee’s best response function shifts upward and
lemma 6 states that R¯B shifts rightward. A rightward shift of the R¯B also shifts the
betray locus rightward. Therefore, betray region enlarges.
An increase in κ shifts the trustee’s best response function upward while R¯B shifts
leftward. The leftward shift of the R¯B shifts the betray locus leftward. Eventually, the
betray region shrinks.
Q.E.D.
In the betray region, the trustee has a non-negative expected net betray payoff,
hence, in every matched pairs whose resources lie in that region, the trustee betrays
if the beneficiary trusts. However, some wealth combinations in that region are out
of consideration because the trustee is never constrained for resource levels below 2x.
An increase in both α or S increases the expected net betray payoff of trustees and
more of the trustees want to betray and get hold of the higher proportion of the surplus
7Increases only if ”betray region” within the set of constrained pairs of resources
exists, in other words, Equation (3.20) should hold.
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or higher surplus. This enlarges the betray region. On the other hand, an increase
in punishment, κ, decreases the number of betraying trustees since their expected net
betray payoff decreases, therefore, the betray region shrinks.
In addition to the betray region, there exist a trust region in our framework. The
trust region includes the complement of the betray region because beneficiary certainly
trusts if trustee does not betray as stated in lemma 2. However, sometimes it may be
possible that a beneficiary trusts even trustee betrays. Hence, there may exist a inter-
section of both betray and trust regions where the beneficiary trusts even if the trustee
betrays. Therefore, the trust region can be defined as the sum of complement of the
betray region and the intersection of both regions. However, we have some difficulties in
achieving a clear characterization of the trust region and obtaining comparative statics
results regarding the effects of the parameters (κ, α, and S) on the trust region.
First of all, unlike the betray region, the size of the trust region is ambiguous
since the relative positions of betray and trust locus is unknown. Figure 3.2 shows
betray and trust loci together, but two dashed lines represent the trust locus since
we do not determine the relative positions of both locus. The ambiguity results from
failure in reaching a clear comparison between R¯ and Rˆ. Different magnitudes of the
parameters change the relative positions of both loci, which makes the analysis very
difficult. Also, we can not determine the effects of parameters on the trust locus, hence,
the trust region. The characterization of the changes in the trust locus due to changes
in parameters is very difficult since calculations do not give clear results. In addition to
that, RˆB, which is the critical wealth level determining the trust decision of the agents,
does not exist in every case. The condition S2 > 4x(κ+αS) must hold for existence of
a trust locus. These difficulties cause an ambiguity in the behavior of the trust region
in model parameters, so, we cannot explain the changes of the trust region when any
of the parameters change.
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Chapter 4
Effects of Wealth Distribution
The wealth distribution in the economy is an important determinant of betray and trust
regions. Specification of the wealth distribution is not necessary but it gives clear results
about the betray and trust regions. On the other hand, individual wealth changes may
cause agents’ actions to change. A potential increase in an agents’ wealth makes the
agent more powerful in the enforcement game with higher resources available. Even a
small increase of wealth of an agent at the margin, may change the action profile of that
agent such as from not trusting to trusting or from performing to betraying. Similarly,
a reduction in wealth may have the opposite impact on agents’ actions.
As Bac (forthcoming) proposed, the trust and betray decisions are strongly related
with the relative enforcement power and wealth. Therefore, wealth distribution and
relative wealth levels of matched agents are the determinant of trust and betray in
the economy. A specific wealth redistribution may have drastic changes in the trust
and betray decisions such that we may have a full-trust equilibrium or even zero-trust
equilibrium. In the constrained equilibrium, agents devote all their resources in order
to win the enforcement stage. Hence, if one of the agents’ wealth changes slightly,
the equilibrium resources change which will affect the probabilities of being successful
in the enforcement stage. The betray region can be seen in the Figure 3.2 with the
shaded area. A specific wealth distribution that is concentrated on the betray region
increases the likeliness to betray in that economy while similarly, wealth distributions
concentrated on the trust region increases the likeliness to trust. In the extreme case,
suppose that the wealth distribution is completely concentrated in the trust region. In
this case all agents who take the role of beneficiary trusts and we have full-trust in the
economy. Similarly, a specific wealth distribution may assign all pairs to the region
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where no agent trusts. Hence, we have a zero-trust equilibrium.
Uniform wealth distribution may be very expressive and give clear results. In
this case, the betray region is the area of that shaded region in Figure 3.2, while
the trust region is the area of the complement of that region plus the intersection of
both regions. ¿From a different perspective, we can also define betray probability as
the likeliness of betray to occur in all transactions in the society. Hence, the betray
probability is the shaded area over the all area. The betray probability may have welfare
implications: in an economy high betray probability corresponds to higher numbers of
pairs to move to the enforcement stage and higher amounts of resources devoted in
the enforcement stage which will result with a decrease in welfare. Clearly, a specific
wealth distribution concentrated on the betray region increases the betray probability
in transactions, therefore, results with welfare losses. On the contrary, a specific wealth
distribution concentrated on the trust region increases the welfare by decreasing the
losses in the enforcement stage.
A special case of wealth equality is studied since it may have nice implications to
analyze an economy where wealth is equally distributed. The next section studies the
trust game and implications in the case of equally distributed wealth.
4.1 The Case of Wealth Equality
We now consider an economy in which wealth is distributed perfectly equal: all agents
in the economy have same wealth levels. Similarly, this corresponds to the case that
two agents with same wealth levels match in order to complete a transaction. In this
perfectly egalitarian economy, per-capita wealth is also the mean wealth in the economy.
Therefore, per-capita wealth is very important since it completely determines the trust
and trustworthiness in the economy. A wealth distribution depending on the level of
per-capita wealth may give very different results.
In this economy, the only difference among agents is disappeared, and agents
are perfectly identical. However, the enforcement game is still asymmetric which is
resulted from the initial amount x that the beneficiary delivers to the trustee as the
cost of trust. In a low per-capita economy both agents have small amounts of resources
to devote in the enforcement game. At low wealth levels, when beneficiary trusts, he has
to incur x to the trustee, moreover, if trustee betrays, the enforcement resources of the
beneficiary decreases while the counterenforcement resources of the trustee increases.
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Since the trustee has an extra amount of x, the trustee is more advantageous in the
enforcement game. In other words, the probability that the trustee to be successful
is higher in low wealth levels. Therefore, in a low per-capita economy, the trustee is
more likely to be untrustworthy and attempt to grab a fraction of the surplus while the
beneficiary is less likely to trust. However, as the mean wealth in the economy increases,
the asymmetry that results from x is diminishing and the probability of trustee being
successful in the enforcement stage is decreasing while the probability of beneficiary to
win the enforcement increases. Hence, in higher wealths, the trustee is more likely to
be trustworthy and the beneficiary is more likely to trust.
In a perfectly egalitarian economy, when two agents with equal wealth levels match
and play the trust game, the resources they devote in the enforcement game is given by
the line in Figure 4.1: RT = RB + 2x. The case in which both agents are constrained
with equal wealth levels occurs if following condition holds: 1
κ+ αS > 16x (4.1)
If the above condition does not hold, the available wealth combinations reveals
an equilibrium where beneficiary is always constrained and trustee is unconstrained.
Therefore, the analysis of both cases in condition 4.1 is necessary in order to obtain
clear results.
Let‘s start with the first case in which condition 4.1 holds. In this case, we
have a constrained equilibrium such that both agents are constrained and have same
wealth levels. As it is seen in the Figure 4.1, at very low per-capita wealth, because
of the asymmetry results from the delivery of x makes the trustee unconstrained and
the beneficiary constrained. Therefore, for that levels of mean wealth the second part
of the lemma 2 applies which states that the trustee betrays. For higher levels of
mean wealth, beneficiary stays as unconstrained, however, after a critical resource level,
1The intersection of RT = RB + 2x and RT (RB) = (RB(κ+αS))
0.5−RB is found by
simply putting RT into the best response function. By arranging the equation we get
2(RB + x) = (RB(κ+ αS))
0.5. Taking the squares of the both sides and set it equal to
zero we have 4R2B + RB(8x− (κ + αS)) + 4x2 = 0. Solving this equation with respect
to RB, the roots of the equation are
RB1 =
(κ+ αS)− 8x− ((8x− (κ+ αS))2 − 64x2)0.5
8
. Inside of the squareroot is positive only when κ+ αS > 16x
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Figure 4.1: If condition 4.1 holds RT = RB + 2x intersects with the trustee’s best
response function, hence, we have pairs in which agents have same wealth levels and
are constrained
trustee becomes constrained too. In this case, both agents are constrained and devote
all their resources in a potential enforcement game. Therefore, there exists a critical
per-capita wealth level,wˆ, which gives trustee zero net expected betray payoff. It is
also shown in Figure 4.1, at the intersection of the betray locus, ρB(RT ), and the
RT = RB + 2x line in lens-shaped area, trustee has zero net expected betray payoff.
Therefore, there exist a mean wealth level, wˆ in a perfectly egalitarian economy where
wealth is equally distributed: for lower per-capita wealth levels than critical wealth wˆ,
all trustees are untrustworthy, on the other hand, if the per-capita wealth is higher than
wˆ, all trustees are trustworthy and we have a full trust equilibrium.
Similar to betray decision, the trust decision of beneficiaries in a perfectly egalitar-
ian economy has important implications. Beneficiaries do not trust in a low per-capita
economy since they do not have enough resources to be successful in the enforcement
game, however, we have a full trust equilibrium if per-capita wealth is sufficiently high.
There exists a critical mean wealth, w¯, which makes the beneficiaries’ indifferent be-
tween trusting and not trusting. Hence, in a perfectly egalitarian economy where per-
capita wealth is lower than the w¯, beneficiaries do not trust, however, if per-capita
wealth is higher than the w¯, we have a full trust equilibrium. As Figure 4.1 shows, the
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critical resource level which makes the beneficiary indifferent in the trust decision is
the intersection of RT = RB + 2x line and the trust locus. The following lemma covers
the trust and betray decisions of beneficiary and trustee, respectively, when condition
(4.1) holds.
Lemma 7 (i) In an economy where wealth is equally distributed, suppose beneficiary
trusts, trustee betrays if wˆ ≤ 1
4
((αS − κ− 2x) +√(αS − κ− 2x)2 + 8x(αS + κ)).
(ii)In a perfectly egalitarian economy, the beneficiary trusts if
w¯ ≥ (S − (S2 − 8Sx)0.5)/4.
Proof.
(i)Note that as w → 0 v(w) > 0
My claim is d
dw
v(w) ≤ 0, v(w) is decreasing with w, eventually becomes negative,
d
dw
v(w) = −4w + αS − κ− 2x ≤ 0.
Now, find the roots
v(RB, RT ) = −RT + RT
RB +RT
αS − RB
RB +RT
κ
v(w) =
w + x
2w
αS − w − x− w − x
2w
κ
v(w) = wαS + xαS − 2w2 − 2wx− wκ+ xκ
v(w) = −2w2 + w(αS − κ− 2x) + x(αS + κ)
The greater root is relevant2
wˆ =
1
4
((αS − κ− 2x) +
√
(αS − κ− 2x)2 + 8x(αS + κ)).
I need to show wˆ ≥ 0,
1
4
((αS − κ− 2x) +
√
(αS − κ− 2x)2 + 8x(αS + κ)) ≥ 0
(αS − κ− 2x)2 ≤ 0(αS − κ− 2x)2 + 8x(αS + κ)
8x(αS + κ) ≥ 0.
2See the Appendix
39
(ii)Note that as w → 0 v(w) < 0
I need to show that du(w)
dw
≥ 0 in order to show u(w) is increasing with w and
becomes positive eventually,
du(w)
dw
= Sx/2w2 − 1 ≥ 0 if Sx > 2w2
u(RB, RT ) = −x+ RBS
RB +RT
−RB
replacing RB = w − x and RT = w + x,
u(w) = −x+ (w − x)S
w − x+ w + x − (w − x)
Setting u(w) = 0 and arranging the equation, we get
2w2 − Sw + Sx = 0
Solving the equation, the smaller one is relevant3.
w¯ =
S − (S2 − 8Sx)0.5
4
I need to show w¯ ≥ 0,
(S − (S2 − 8Sx)0.5)/4 ≥ 0⇒ S2 ≥ S2 − 8Sx⇒ 8Sx > 0.
Now, Sx should be greater than w¯, in order to show that u(w) is increasing with
x and become positive,
Sx ≥ 2((S − (S2 − 8xS)0.5)/4)2 ⇒ 8Sx ≥ S2 − 2S(S2 − 8xS)0.5 + S2 − 8xS
2S(8x+ (S2 − 8xS)0.5) ≥ 2S2 ⇒ 8x+ (S2 − 8xS)0.5 ≥ S
3See the Appendix
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Take the square of both sides
64x2 + S2 − 8xS + 16x(S2 − 8xS)0.5 ≥ S2 ⇒ 8x+ 2(S2 − 8xS)0.5 ≥ S
Again take the square of both sides we get
64x2 + 32x(S2 − 8xS)0.5 + 4S2 − 32Sx ≥ S2 ⇒ Sx > w¯
Since condition (4.1) holds S > κ+ αS > 16x
Q.E.D.
The previous lemma covers the betray and trust decisions of constrained agents
when there exists a region in which all agents have same wealth levels. In an economy
where wealth is equally distributed among agents, per-capita wealth level is very deter-
ministic. The relative positions of wˆ and w¯ is ambiguous since magnitudes of α, κ, x,
and S determines their relative positions. In a sufficiently low per-capita economy, both
trust and trustworthiness is zero: trustees betray while beneficiaries may never trust
since trustees are more advantageous in the enforcement stage while beneficiaries do
not have enough resources to win the enforcement.4 On the other hand, in an economy
with a sufficiently high per-capita wealth level we may have a full trust equilibrium
where beneficiaries trust and trustees never betray. 5
The second case is that condition (4.1) does not hold: the equal wealth level line,
RT = RB + 2x, never intersects with the trustee‘s best response function RT (RB),
as in Figure 4.2. In this case, matched agents‘ resource combination (RB, RT ) never
exists in the constrained region. Therefore, there does not exist an equilibrium in which
both agents are constrained, instead, trust game has an equilibrium in which trustee
is unconstrained but beneficiary is constrained. The following lemma summarizes the
result in the case that condition (4.1) does not hold: pairs formed by agents with equal
wealth levels does not exist in the lens-shaped area.
Lemma 8 (i) The trustee betrays if RB ≤ R¯B, performs otherwise.
(ii)The beneficiary trusts if RB ≥ RˆB, does not trust otherwise.
4Let denote the per-capita with wp. If wp is smaller than both wˆ and w¯, a zero trust
equilibrium exists where beneficiaries do not trust while all trustees betray. However,
if wˆ > wp > w¯, although all trustees betray, all beneficiaries trust
5A full trust equilibrium exists only when wp > w¯ regardless of the magnitude of the
wˆ. If wˆ > wp > w¯ in a full trust equilibrium all trustees betray, however if wp > w¯ > wˆ
in the full trust equilibrium all trustees are trustworthy.
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Figure 4.2: If condition (4.1) does not hold, the RT = RB + 2x never intersects with
the trustee’s best response.
Proof.
(i)If the condition (4.1) does not hold, then we have a case in which the beneficiary
is constrained and the trustee is unconstrained. In Lemma 2 it is stated that the trustee
betrays if RB < R¯B and performs otherwise. Lemma 2 perfectly applies here.
(ii)If the condition (4.1) does not hold, then we have a case in which the beneficiary
is constrained and the trustee is unconstrained. In Lemma 3 it is stated that the
beneficiary does not trust if RB < RˆB and does not trust, otherwise. Hence, Lemma 3
perfectly applies here.
Q.E.D.
The previous lemma covers the betray and trust decisions in an economy where
wealth is equally distributed but at least one of the agents is unconstrained. In this case,
pairs are formed by constrained beneficiaries and unconstrained trustees. Therefore,
the previous results explain the behaviors of both agents. A sufficiently low per-capita
wealth in the economy results with zero trust equilibrium where all trustees betray.6
6If wp is smaller than both RˆB and R¯B, a zero trust equilibrium exists where benefi-
ciaries do not trust while all trustees betray. However, if R¯B > wp > RˆB, although all
trustees betray, all beneficiaries trust
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However, in an economy with sufficiently high per-capita wealth full trust equilibrium
exists in the economy where trustees never betray.7
7A full trust equilibrium exists only when wp > RˆB regardless of the magnitude of
the R¯B. If R¯B > wp > RˆB in a full trust equilibrium all trustees betray, however if
wp > RˆB > R¯B in the full trust equilibrium all trustees are trustworthy.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The relationship between wealth and trust is analyzed in our theoretical model where
enforcement game is introduced if betray occurs. We demonstrate that agents’ wealth
and relative wealth of their partners are the main determinants of trust and trust-
worthiness since agents trust or are trustworthy when they believe they have enough
resources to enforce broken promises. We showed that in the constrained equilibrium,
agents devote all their resources in order to be successful in the enforcement stage. In
equilibrium, wealthy agents trust and are trustworthy if their partners are wealthy, on
the other hand, they are untrustworthy if their partners are sufficiently poor. Incentives
to be untrustworthy is positively related with the surplus and own wealth, however, neg-
atively related with the punishment and partners’ wealth. Similarly, trusting incentives
increases with an increase in own wealth and decreases with partners’ wealth. A betray
region region (combinations of wealth) is identified in which agents are always untrust-
worthy. The number of the untrustworthy agents increases with surplus, on the other
hand, decreases if punishment is higher.
The trust and trustworthiness decisions are strongly related with the wealth distri-
bution. Individual wealth increases may change the trust and trustworthiness decisions.
Interestingly, all positive wealth changes may not change the actions of agents even be-
ing the wealthiest in the economy. Wealth redistributions may induce drastic changes
in the overall trust and trustworthiness. A sufficiently concentrated wealth distribution
in the betray region results with no trustworthiness and less trust. However, if wealth
is concentrated in the trust region, as expected, full-trust equilibrium is reached in the
economy. A wealth redistribution assigns the same wealth to all agents in the economy
may result with two equilibria; in a sufficiently low per-capita economy there is zero
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trust while a sufficiently high mean wealth results with full-trust.
Although this paper brings a new perspective to the trust issue, more advanced
models should be developed for examining the determinants and the impacts of trust
on economic issues. First of all, our model suggest income as the only heterogeneity
factor in the society, however, it is much more complex in reality. In addition to wealth
differentiation among people, race, ethnicity, education level, etc. can be embedded into
the model as another heterogeneity factors in the society. A measure in the light of these
variables between (0, 1) could be used to classify the people and agents with measure
slightly higher than 0 can be classified as the poor agents such as black, uneducated
agents, and agents with higher measure could be assigned as the relatively rich agents.
Hence, effects of wealth and other variables on trust and trustworthiness could be
analyzed in this framework.
Another extension could be the addition of judicial efficiency into the model.
Judicial efficiency is very important in the enforcement stage, since we expect a higher
probability of success if judicial system works well in an economy. The probability of
being successful in the enforcement stage can be redefined as the probability we used
multiplied with a variable δ which represents the judicial efficiency and takes values
in the interval (0, 1). If judicial system works perfectly, this corresponds to δ = 1 and
judicial system does not work well may correspond to 0.5 > δ > 0.
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Appendix
Derivation of equation (1)
d
dRB
uM = −1 + ((RB +RT )−RB)S
(RB +RT )2
((RB +RT )−RB)S = (RB +RT )2
RTS = (RB +RT )
2
RB = (RTS)
0.5 −RT .
Derivation of equation (2)
d
dRB
vM = −1− (0−RB)κ
(RB +RT )2
+
((RB +RT )−RT )αS
(RB +RT )2
= 0
RB(κ+ αS) = (RB +RT )
2
RT = (RB(κ+ αS))
o.5 −RB
Derivation of the Equilibrium: Equation (7)
Best responses imply that RTS = (RB +RT )
2 and RB(κ+ αS) = (RB +RT )
2 so
by combining these two equations, we get
RB
RT
=
S
κ+ αS
then we can write RB in terms of RT as follows
RB =
SRT
κ+ αS
then by putting this into the equation (1) we get
RTS
αS + κ
= (RTS)
0.5 −RT
(RTS) = (αS + κ)(RTS)
0.5 − (αS + κ)RT
RT (αS + κ+ S) = (αS + κ)(S)
0.5R0.5T
R0.5T =
(αS + κ)(S)0.5
αS + κ+ S
1
R∗T =
(αS + κ)2(S)
(αS + κ+ S)2
Then putting this into the equation we can find the
R∗B =
S
αS + κ
R∗T
R∗B =
(αS + κ)(S)2
(αS + κ+ S)2
Relevance of R¯B
The RB1 is relevant since the other root is greater than the unconstrained equi-
librium.
First, we show that RB1 > 0
2κ+ αS − 2(κ2 + καS)0.5 > 0⇒ 2κ+ αS > 2(κ2 + καS)0.5
Take the square of both sides then
4κ2 + 4καS + (αS)2 > 4κ2 + 4καS
Since (αS)2 > 0.
Now, I show that
RB2 > R
∗
B ⇒ 2κ+ αS + 2(κ2 + καS)0.5 > (αS+κ)(S)
2
(αS+κ+S)2
(αS + κ+ S)2(2κ+ αS + 2(κ2 + καS)0.5) > (αS + κ)(S)2
This holds since (αS + κ+ S)2(2κ+ αS) > (αS + κ)(S)2
Relevance of RˆB
The RB1 is relevant since the other root is greater than the unconstrained equi-
librium.
First, we show that RB1 > 0
RB1 =
S2 − 2x(αS + κ)− ((S2 − 2x(αS + κ))2 − 4x2(αS + κ)2)0.5
2(αS + κ)
> 0
S2 − 2x(αS + κ) > ((S2 − 2x(αS + κ))2 − 4x2(αS + κ)2)0.5
2
Take the square of both sides we obtain
S4 − 4xS2(αS + κ) + 4x2(αS + κ)2 > S4 − 4xS2(αS + κ)
Since 4x2(αS + κ)2 > 0
Now, I show that
RB2 > R
∗
B ⇒ S
2−2x(αS+κ)+((S2−2x(αS+κ))2−4x2(αS+κ)2)0.5
2(αS+κ)
> (αS+κ)(S)
2
(αS+κ+S)2
(αS + κ+ S)2(S2 − 2x(αS + κ) + (S4 − 4xS2(αS + κ))0.5) > (αS + κ)S22(αS + κ)
Eliminate the (αS + κ+ S)2(S4 − 4xS2(αS + κ))0.5 term. Then, we have
((κ+ αS)2 + S2 + 2S(κ+ αS))(S2) > (κ+ αS)(S2(κ+ αS) + 2x(κ+ αS + S)2)
Then eliminate the S2(κ+ αS) term. We obtain
S3(2(κ+ αS) + S) > (κ+ αS)(S2(κ+ αS) + 2x(κ+ αS + S)2)
S3(κ+ αS) + S3(κ+ αS + S)) > S2(κ+ αS)2 + 2x(αS + κ)(κ+ αS + S)2)
S3(κ+ αS) > S2(κ+ αS)2 since S > κ+ αS
And S3(κ+ αS + S)) > 2x(αS + κ)(κ+ αS + S)2) since S2 > 4x(κ+ αS)
Relevance of wˆ
The smaller root is irrelevant since it is less than zero:
wˆ =
1
4
((αS − κ− 2x)−
√
(αS − κ− 2x)2 + 8x(αS + κ)) < 0
(αS − κ− 2x) <
√
(αS − κ− 2x)2 + 8x(αS + κ)
This obviously holds, since the left side of the equation is negative while the right
side is positive.
Relevance of w¯
The net trust payoff is increases if the following condition hold
Sx > 2w2
3
The above equation holds for the smaller root. However, it does not hold for
the greater root which reveals that the net trust payoff is decreasing if Sx < 2w2,
and eventually, reaches zero at the higher root w¯2 =
S+(S2−8Sx)0.5
4
. Now, I show that
Sx < 2w¯2:
2w¯22 = 2(
S + (S2 − 8Sx)0.5
4
)2 > Sx
S2 + S2 − 8Sx+ 2S(s2 − 8Sx)0.5 > 8Sx
2S2 + 2S(s2 − 8Sx)0.5 > 16Sx
2S2 > 16Sx, since condition 4.1 holds S > κ+ αS > 16x
4
